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COLLOQUIUM
CIVIL LITIGATION ETHICS
AT A TIME OF VANISHING TRIALS
INTRODUCTION
LAWYERS’ ETHICS
BEYOND THE VANISHING TRIAL:
UNREPRESENTED CLAIMANTS, DE FACTO
AGGREGATIONS, ARBITRATION MANDATES,
AND PRIVATIZED PROCESSES
Judith Resnik*
I. DIFFUSING DISPUTES AS TRIALS VANISH
Trials are a vivid variable in the world of litigation, as reflected in the
title of this colloquium, Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing
Trials. The conveners have wisely drawn attention to the disjuncture
between legal ethics and today’s litigation world. In this Introduction, I
argue that the challenges for lawyers loom larger than those reflected in the
declining rate of trials. More facets of contemporary dispute resolution
need to be engaged when contemplating the topics and roles that legal
ethics need to address in the decades to come.
Below, I sketch the contours of practices in state and federal courts,
where millions of litigants appear in civil cases without attorneys. When
clients are represented, they are often grouped by judges and lawyers into
aggregates, created through a variety of methods, both formal and informal.
* Many thanks to Bruce Green for inviting me to participate in the colloquium entitled Civil
Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham University School of Law
and to the participants for a lively and insightful exchange. Thanks for help on research and
thinking through this and related projects is due to Jonah Gelbach, Deborah Hensler, Sam
Issacharoff, Andrew Bradt, and members of the staff of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts and of the Federal Judicial Center—Emery Lee, Carol Krafka, Donna Stienstra,
Wendell Skidgel, and Brad Sweet, as well as to Yale Law Librarian Michael VanderHeijden;
to Denny Curtis, Vicki Jackson, and Abbe Gluck; to a wonderful group of students with
whom I have learned a great deal—Matt Butler, David Chen, Kyle Edwards, Clare Kane,
Marianna Mao, Urja Mittal, Heather Richard, Iva Velickovic, Regina Wang, Emily Wanger;
and to Bonnie Posick, for her expert editorial assistance.
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As this colloquium’s title reflects, trial rates are down; one in one hundred
federal civil cases goes to trial. Less in focus is that case filings are also
flattening and for an array of reasons, one of which is that millions of
potential claimants are prevented from pursuing claims collectively (either
in courts or in arbitration) because of provisions in job applications and
consumer documents precluding class actions.
To the extent people do go to court, they are often greeted by mandates to
resolve disputes privately. Courts are now venues in which public
adjudication has taken a back seat to alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
which generally takes place outside the public purview. Agencies are
another important venue of adjudicatory procedures, where tens of
thousands of adjudications take place.1 Many of their proceedings also
involve unrepresented parties, and many agencies’ hearings are not readily
accessible to the public.
In short, vanishing trials are but a piece of the privatization and
relocation of process. In an earlier article, I used the term “dispute
diffusion” to capture the eclipse of adjudication in courts as the central
paradigm of government-based dispute resolution.2 I further argued that a
variety of sources are producing this new policy through statutes, federal
and state regulations, procedural rulemaking, and by way of court-made
doctrine. In the 1980s, I identified a shift to “managerial judges”3—
deploying judges to become conciliators. In addition, other individuals are
enlisted to serve as “neutrals” or as arbitrators, both in and out of courts.
More recently, I identified an array of provisions, which I called
“Alternative Civil Procedure Rules” (ACPR), that organize these diverse
sets of practices but do so through a maze of different promulgations.4
Rather than an accessible and public codification, of which the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are an iconic example, the ACPR are hard to find
and to piece together. But taken collectively, the ACPR—like the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure—reflect norms about what procedural systems
should do. The ACPR value privatized processes. Further, unlike
contemporary rule systems based in courts, the ACPR neither address the

1. A new, ambitious database, which is a joint project of the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS) and Michael Asimow at Stanford Law School, seeks to catalog,
compare, and describe formal and informal federal agency adjudication and the federal
administrative judiciary. The searchable materials (coming from the agencies) include data
on caseloads, time to disposition, and legal representation. The database compiles
information from each agency separately; our tally is that it includes 110 federal agencies
reporting pending caseloads. See Caseload Statistics, STAN. U.: ADJUDICATION RES., https://
acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/caseload-statistics (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/5NA3-F59N]; see also Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The
Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 783 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing].
2. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2807–08 (2015)
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes].
3. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); see also Judith
Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
4. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2807.
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needs of indigent users nor attend to making a place for public observers to
attend proceedings.5
Lawyers representing clients as well as those serving as judges are the
sources and the objects of many of the developments and new rules.
Lawyers’ ethical codes speak of lawyers as zealous advocates6 and as
officers of the courts, obliged to support the administration of justice.7
Ethical codes likewise ask judges to work to improve the courts.8
Admission to the bar in some states is conditioned on providing public
service, and judges around the country have called attention to the
difficulties of an underfunded, underlawyered legal system.9
All of these shifts that I have sketched (and that I will discuss more
below) change both the roles of lawyers and the prices of certain forms of
lawyers’ work—producing new markets and reducing the relevance of
others. The doctrine, legislation, and procedural rules marginalize
constitutional norms of open and public courts—practices that have long
served to regulate both lawyers and judges by enabling public observation
of and therefore debate about the processes and outcomes of the decisions
that result. Elsewhere I have detailed the resulting power asymmetries; this
colloquium brings questions of lawyers’ ethics to the fore.
Can and will lawyers impose regulation on themselves in response?
Ought regulations be placed instead in statutes and court rules? And what
shape should such provisions take, with what potential impact on the norms
of lawyering and the body politic? This colloquium offers a series of
articles responding to aspects of these new and daunting challenges.
II. DEPICTING THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
OF CIVIL LITIGATION
A few charts and brief commentary provide a picture of the dockets of
the state and federal courts. Figure 1 is important to frame the discussion
here because it helps to bring state and federal courts—and the ethics of the

5. See id. at 2807–08.
6. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“The duty
of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of law.”).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer, as a
member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).
8. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A
judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary . . . .”); id. Canon 2, r. 2.2 (“A judge shall uphold and apply the law . . . .”).
9. In New York, for example, “[e]very applicant admitted to the New York State
bar . . . shall complete at least 50 hours of qualifying pro bono service prior to filing an
application for admission with the appropriate Appellate Division department of the
Supreme Court.” N.Y. CT. R. § 520.16(a); see also JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE STATE OF THE
JUDICIARY 2015: ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING THE IDEAL A REALITY (2015), http://
www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/SOJ-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L6Q-M9VU]; Deborah L.
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2415 (1999).
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lawyers who practice before them—into view.10 As its title reflects, it is a
snapshot of the volume of filings in federal and state trial courts in 2010.
Figure 1: Comparing the Volume of Filings:
State and Federal Trial Courts, 2010

60,000,000

47,640,905

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

359,594

1,531,997

0
Federal Civil and
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Bankruptcy Filings

State Filings
(including Domestic
Relations)

10. Federal information was gathered from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
Data on the state filings came from the National Center for State Courts. The number of
state filings was an estimate. This figure was also published in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes,
supra note 2, at 2833 fig.2.
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The figure details that about 360,000 civil and criminal cases were filed
in the federal trial-level courts in 2010, along with more than a million
bankruptcy petitions. State filings numbered more than 47 million, and that
figure excludes what figure 2 includes—filings that states have catalogued
as juvenile and traffic cases.11
Figure 2: State Trial Court Filings, 1976–2008
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11. Data were gathered from the National Center for State Courts’s annual reports, and
these figures are estimates as not all states report data in all categories. This figure was also
published in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2833 fig.3.
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What do we know about who brings cases and how they are handled?
Given the volume of activity in state courts, the development of national
data is challenging. Yet the National Center for State Courts provided a
window through its 2015 publication, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in
State Courts, which analyzed almost a million cases that were disposed of
during 2012–2013 in ten major urban counties.12 As the report details,
most of the cases concluded within a year. In most, at least one party was
without a lawyer, and most of the dispositions were administrative
conclusions, rather than by trials or other forms of adjudication.
Figure 3 brings the work of state courts into focus by providing details
about state court filings.13 This chart highlights some of the major findings
of the report, specifically that about two-thirds of the filings involved
contract claims and that more than one-half of that set of claims were
landlord-tenant and debt collection cases.14 The more recent survey
contrasts with the 1992 data collection, when about half of the claims
analyzed were tort cases.15 The National Center for State Courts’s 2012–
2013 data put tort cases at 7 percent.16

12. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INST., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE:
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, at iii (2015) [hereinafter STATE
COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION].
13. Data for figure 3 were drawn from Civil Justice Initiative: The Landscape of Civil
Litigation in State Courts. See STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at
17–20; see also Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and
State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1929 n.481 (2016)
[hereinafter Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”].
14. See STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at iii.
15. The 1992 data were drawn from case outcomes in the seventy-five “most populous
counties” in the country. Of about 762,000 tort, contract, and property dispositions,
approximately 378,000 were tort cases. See STEVEN K. SMITH, CAROL J. DEFRANCES,
PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN A. GOERDT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF
STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 6 (1995), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF [https://perma.cc/N4KL-WQ7A]; see also CAROL J.
DEFRANCES, STEVEN K. SMITH, PATRICK A. LANGAN, BRIAN J. OSTROM, DAVID B. ROTTMAN
& JOHN A. GOERDT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992:
CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2 (1995), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5J-MBBR].
16. STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at iv.
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Figure 3: National Center for State Courts:
The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, 2015
925,344 civil cases, 10 major urban counties

As to the parties, information was available about the presence of lawyers
in about 650,000 cases. In most, “at least one party was self-represented,
usually the defendant.”17 The researchers found that the results of the
lawsuits were that, in about three-quarters of the judgments, the sums were

17. Id. In 1992, attorneys had represented both parties in 95 percent of the cases; in
2012–2013, in 24 percent of the cases. See id. at 31; see also CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT
ADM’RS & NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING
31–32 (version 2.0 2014).
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under $5,200. As for the means of resolution, the study reported that 4
percent were disposed of by trials.18
The data on other forms of dispositions are what social scientists call
“noisy,” in that about a quarter have an “unspecified judgment,” and the
grounds for the 35 percent dismissed or the 10 percent settled were not
obvious from the court documents.19 Yet overall, the National Center for
State Courts’s analysis resonates with the discussion in this colloquium by
Taunya Banks about civil trials as “a film illusion.”20 Further, the numbers
put into sharp relief the importance of identifying the ethics of settlement,
as Howard Erichson analyzes, “in the absence of anticipated
adjudication.”21
Turn then to the federal courts, where the arena to study is narrower, the
resources are greater, and hence more data are available. A first point is
that an assumption of the federal courts as crowded and overworked is not
supported by the aggregate data. Filings in the federal court system, which
had more than doubled between 1970 and 1985, have experienced little
growth in the last three decades. An overview of filings in the U.S. district
courts during the last century is provided in figure 4.22
18. STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at 20. Adjudication for
these purposes included a judge or jury trial, summary judgment, and binding arbitration. In
the 1992 survey, 62 percent of the cases were disposed of through settlements, and 3 percent
were disposed of by judge or jury trial. Thus, of the almost one million cases, 32,124 trials
took place, of which 1109 (3 percent) were jury trials, and 31,015 (97 percent) were bench
trials. Jury awards exceeded $500,000 in 17 (3 percent) of the cases, and 75 percent of the
jury awards in tort cases were below $152,000. The 2012–2013 study also noted that, as
contrasted with 1992, both parties were represented in 24 percent of the bench trials. Id. at
iv, 20–25.
19. Id. at 20–21. The dismissal rate recorded in the 2012–2013 study was more than
three times higher than that recorded in the 1992 study, and the settlement rate was less than
one-fifth of that recorded in the 1992 study. Id. at 21. The authors of the 2012–2013 study
noted that differences in methodology may account for the different results. The newer
study collected data from courts with limited rather than general jurisdiction, and that
selection affects the cases that fell into the study. Id. Further, data for the 2012–2013 study
were taken from case management systems rather than through researchers looking at
individual court files, as they had in 1992. Id. at 22. Therefore, the study’s authors reported,
“It is particularly difficult to interpret the dismissal and unspecified judgment rates in the
[2012–2013] study.” Id. For instance, the study explains that litigants may request that
settled cases be dismissed with prejudice and that cases with these designations were
classified as settlements in the 2012–2013 study but that if the cases were coded in the case
management systems as dismissals, the study would do so as well. Id. Moreover, the study
reports that “unspecified judgments may include a substantial proportion of cases that were
actually default judgments.” Id.
20. Taunya Lovell Banks, Civil Trials: A Film Illusion?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1969
(2017).
21. Howard M. Erichson, Settlement in the Absence of Anticipated Adjudication, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2017 (2017).
22. While the number of filings is a function of multiple variables, based on the increase
in population and new federal causes of actions, one would expect an increase in filings.
The stagnancy observed instead therefore suggests a decline in federal filing, a phenomenon
other scholars have noted, alongside a shift in the mix of cases. See Patricia W. Hatamyar
Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1180;
cf. Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the Federal Courts Since the Good
Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921, 924. This figure, like some of the others in this
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Figure 4: Growth Rate of Federal District Court Filings, 1905–2015
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In the most recent fifteen years, civil and criminal filings ranged from
about 300,000 to 360,000 cases per year. In 2015, 279,036 civil cases were
filed,23 and the federal government brought more than 60,000 criminal
cases,24 of which about a quarter involved multiple defendants.25

Introduction, has been used in other articles I have written. See, e.g., Resnik, Revising Our
“Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1910 fig.13.
23. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1 (2015) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C01
Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN9H-WUWL].
24. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.D (2015) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2015 tbl.D], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/D00CSep15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M5F3-CG24].
25. In 2015, the U.S. government commenced prosecutions against 80,069 defendants.
U.S. COURTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.D-1 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/D01FugSep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8XA-PBZ6]. The number of
cases filed was 61,202. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.D, supra note 24.
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The contemporary filings are about half of what a 1995 projection had
anticipated, which predicted that more than 610,000 cases would be filed by
2010.26 As the bar graph in figure 5 depicts, the filings in 2010 (361,323
cases) were higher than the 340,238 cases brought in 2015.27

26. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 15 tbl.3 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtslongrangeplan_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3L3-T9DS]. The 1995 Long Range Plan is also reprinted in the Federal
Rules Decisions. See 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995). Subsequent references refer to page numbers as
printed in the original document.
27. This figure is derived from multiple sources. Data for 1995 projections of 2010
filings were derived from the 1995 Long Range Plan. See 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 26, at 15 tbl.3. Data for 2010 actual filings and 2015 actual
filings were derived from Administrative Office of the United States. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2015 tbl.D, supra note 24; see also U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
2015 tbl.C (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C00Sep15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V64-WQZX]; U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 138, 204 tbls.C & D (2010), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/JudicialBusinespdfversion_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3CJ-LGEF]. Note that criminal filings are of cases, not defendants.
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Figure 5: 1995 Projections of 2010 Federal Filings
and Actual Federal Filings, 2010 and 2015
1995 projections
of 2010 filings

2010 actual
filings

2015 actual
filings

610,800

361,323

340,238

Moreover, the actual workload—as measured on a metric of cases per
active Article III district court judge28—varies greatly across the United
States. The judiciary has gathered data on its own caseloads for decades, in
part to document for Congress the need to authorize more judgeships.29 To

28. See Moore, supra note 22, at 1189 (discussing the complexity of measurement).
29. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 938 (2000).
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do so, the courts developed a system of “weighted [civil] filings by
authorized judgeships.”30 While distinguishing antitrust and patent cases
from student loan and other civil suits, as well as from criminal
prosecutions,31 this record-keeping system has not yet used as factors
30. The federal judiciary began to use a system of weighted filings in 1946, a few years
before the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts began its work. Judges were asked
periodically to do “time diary studies” with timesheets. See Explanation of Selected
Terms, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/explanation_of_selected_terms
_september_2016_0.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7EVW-T6A6]. A
revised system—whose output is reflected for the last decade of data charted in figure 5—
was put into place in 2004 and based on analyses of cases terminated in 2002. Id. The new
approach uses an events-analysis approach. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) developed the
weightings by calculating “the sum of all weights assigned to civil cases, criminal
defendants, and supervised release hearings” and then dividing those sums “by the number
of authorized Article III judgeships assigned to each district.” U.S. District Courts—Judicial
Business 2015, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courtsjudicial-business-2015 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CV8Y-444E]. As also
explained by the federal judiciary’s administrative wings, case weights are a predictive
measure of the time a judge will spend on a case. For example, the average civil or criminal
case is assigned a weight of 1.00, while “[m]ore time-consuming cases” receive higher
weights and “cases requiring relatively little time from judges receive lower weights.” Id.
In March of 2016, the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS) adopted a
new case weighting system, meant to “fine-tune its requests for new district judgeships.”
Judicial Conference Addresses Judgeship Needs Issues, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 15, 2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/03/15/judicial-conference-addresses-judgeship-needsissues [https://perma.cc/T3Y7-E5KN]. According to Carol Krafka, who directs the FJC’s
district court case weighting studies, “the re-evaluation was prompted simply by the need to
update weights that had not changed since they were adopted in 2004 . . . and we knew from
analyzing more recent data that there had been changes in the demand that certain case types
placed on district judge time.” E-mail from Carol Krafka, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to author (Oct.
5, 2016, 2:05 PM) [hereinafter Krafka, Oct. 5 E-mail] (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
31. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COMPARISON OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED UPDATED CASE
WEIGHTS BY CASE TYPE (2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). In designing the
new weighting system, the federal judiciary relied on a 2015 FJC study that included
objective data from nearly 300,000 civil and criminal case terminations regarding
the amount of time required to conduct trials and other proceedings such as
evidentiary hearings or pretrial conferences, and also included subjective measures
based on a survey of approximately 220 active district judges regarding their
estimates of the time required to perform case-related work in chambers.
Judicial Conference Addresses Judgeship Needs Issues, supra note 30.
In the 2016 case weighting system, the weights assigned to a number of types of
civil cases decreased, including for patent, environmental, FOIA, and death penalty habeas
corpus matters, while the weights assigned to many criminal case type categories increased.
See Krafka, Oct. 5 E-mail, supra note 30.
The method of computing weights comes through deputy court clerks, sitting in
court at all hearings, conferences, and trials at which a district judge presides. No such data
are recorded for the work judges do in chambers. E-mail from Carol Krafka, Fed. Judicial
Ctr., to author (Nov. 16, 2016, 1:48 PM) [hereinafter Krafka, Nov. 16 E-mail] (on file with
the Fordham Law Review). As Krafka explained, in the 2014 revisions, the courts assigned a
value for the time spent on events that were recorded on the docket in the cases analyzed and
did so through surveying a selected sample of active district court judges who were asked to
estimate the times spent on various activities, such as discovery motions in different types of
cases. Then, case weights were computed by summing “the time associated with all of the
proceeding and non-proceeding events docketed in a large sample of cases” and categorizing
“individual cases into case types” to determine averages of time spent within a case time, so
as to have “the basis for (non-normalized) weights.” Id.
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whether a litigant is unrepresented32 or whether a case is grouped with other
cases or is a certified class action.33
But what the current methods do show is a significant variability in
dockets, as figure 6 depicting five district courts evinces.34 As is detailed,
life-tenured judges in active status in the District of Columbia had, between
2001 and 2015, about 200 cases per authorized judgeship; in the Central
District of California, such judges had more than 600 cases. These
measures neither include the contributions of Article III judges who have
taken senior status nor of magistrate judges.35

For more on the method’s development, see generally PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL
KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY (2005),
and Philip Habel & Kevin Scott, New Measures of Judges’ Caseload for the Federal District
Courts, 1964–2012, 2 J.L. & CTS. 153 (2014).
32. The data collected by the Administrative Office denote unrepresented individuals as
“pro se.” Pro se district court filings were not counted in either the 2004 or 2016 weighting
systems. See E-mail from Brad Sweet, U.S. Cts., to author (Oct. 2, 2016, 1:35 PM)
[hereinafter Sweet, Oct. 2 E-mail] (on file with the Fordham Law Review). In contrast, the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts adjusts for pro se cases in its calculation of
weighted caseloads for appellate courts, with pro se case filings weighted as taking one-third
of the time of non-pro se filings. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-862T,
FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS: THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF DISTRICT AND APPELLATE JUDGESHIP
CASE-RELATED WORKLOAD MEASURES (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657661.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3WB-AYJE].
33. Weights “are assigned only to those cases in district courts that arise as original
proceedings, by removal from state court, or by interdistrict transfer” and hence exclude
cases stemming from “reopenings, remands, appeals from magistrate judgments, or transfers
by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.” U.S. District Courts—Judicial
Business 2015, supra note 30; see also Sweet, Oct. 2 E-mail, supra note 32. As Sweet
explained, because the weighted case data include only cases that originate in a particular
district court, cases that are removed to the district court from state court, cases that are
transferred from another district, and multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases transferred into a
district court for pretrial are all not included in the weighted case data. Sweet, Oct. 2 E-mail,
supra note 32. However, individual cases, when filed, that become part of an MDL or if
remanded back for trial thereafter are counted in the weighted case law through the
“original” proceeding measure. MDLs are a part of an assessment of the need for new
judgeships by way of the U.S. Judicial Conference’s Judicial Resources Committee, which
seeks to consider both quantitative and qualitative impacts (including some analysis of a
district’s weighted caseload with and without the inclusion of MDL cases), in part to assess
whether an influx in filings is temporary. MDLs also have some impact on case weight
computations. See Krafka, Nov. 16 E-mail, supra note 31.
34. These data come from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See Caseload
Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseloadstatistics-data-tables (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (search by table number “X-1A”; then, to
access the data, click on the report corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/5L5R2G2N].
35. “Authorized Article III judgeships” excludes senior judges and magistrate judges,
and this metric also does not take into account law clerks or staff attorneys. See Stephen B.
Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices
Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 23–31 (2012) (detailing the significant workload contributions of senior judges);
see also Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J.
607, 615–16 (2002).
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Figure 6: Weighted Civil Filings per Authorized Judgeship, 2001–2015
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In addition to this kind of disuniformity, a remarkable amount of civil
litigation in the federal courts is clustered together, consolidated under the
1968 “multidistrict litigation” (MDL) statute36 and distributed in an uneven
pattern to specific district court judges around the United States.
Understanding the prevalence of aggregation in the federal courts requires a
shift from looking at filings to analyzing pending cases. In contrast to the
flattening filings in the last three decades, the number of pending civil cases
(tracked in figure 7) has grown—more than tripling between 1970 and 2015
and increasing from about 300,000 cases in 2010 to 341,813 cases in
2015.37

36. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
37. The data from 1972 to 1990 come from Annual Reports of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. For the data for 1991 to 2015, see Caseload Statistics Data Tables,
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables (last
visited Mar. 25, 2017) (search by table number “C-6”; then, to access the data, click on the
report corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/5L5R-2G2N]. Data for each year
between 1968 and 1990 are for the year ending in June 30; data for each year between 1991
and 2015 are for the year ending in September 30. I am in the midst of writing about the
relationship between class actions and MDLs and the role played by aggregation more
generally, and this chart is drawn from drafts of those articles, forthcoming in essays on class
actions.
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Figure 7: Total Civil Cases Pending
in Federal District Courts, 1972–2015
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But tens of thousands of these cases are not dealt with individually.
Rather, as of the fall of 2015, almost 40 percent of federal civil cases were
part of MDLs,38 created when a panel of judges ruled that the statutory
criteria for pretrial aggregation (“civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact . . . pending in different districts”) were met.39 In
1968, Congress authorized the Chief Justice to designate seven federal
judges to serve on the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML),
which decides whether to transfer pending cases to one judge and selects
38. Specifically, 132,788 cases out of 341,813 pending cases were MDLs. U.S. JUDICIAL
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015], http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML
_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C92LGR8G]; see also JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1, supra note 23.
39. Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1911
(citing STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note
38, then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)).
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specific federal district court judges to preside during the pretrial phase over
the cases so grouped.40 As the essays by Lynn Baker, Theodore Rave, and
Adam Zimmerman in this colloquium discuss,41 these mandatory, non-optout, pretrial aggregations are run by court-appointed lead lawyers—a
Plaintiff Steering Committee (PSC) or Plaintiff Executive Committee
(PEC)—functioning as ad hoc law firms and representing a significant
number of plaintiffs who had filed individual lawsuits.42
The growth of the aegis of MDL is significant, as is charted in figure 8,
which shows the relationship between the pending civil docket and cases
grouped together in MDL proceedings.43 In 1991, fewer than 2,232 cases
(or about 1 percent of the civil docket) were part of MDL proceedings.44 In
2013, about a third of the caseload was in MDL proceedings.45 By
September 2015, the percentage had risen again. Of 341,813 federal civil
cases pending, 132,788 were concentrated in 271 proceedings aggregated
before a single judge.46

40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
41. See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1943 (2017); D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2175 (2017); Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2275 (2017).
42. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
71, 88–89 (2015); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Multidistrict Litigation and
Aggregation Alternatives, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 877, 880 (2001); Judith Resnik, Dennis
Curtis & Deborah Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 321 (1996); see also Judith Resnik, From
“Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik,
From “Cases to “Litigation”].
43. The data on pending civil cases come from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. See supra note 37. The MDL data for 1972 to 1990 are from the Annual Reports of
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. For the MDL data from 1991 to 2015,
see Statistical Information, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://
www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SA7WA6CJ]. Data for each year from 1972 to 1990 are for the year ending on June 30; data for
each year from 1991 to 2015 are for the year ending on September 30.
44. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL
ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1991).
45. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 22, at 1214. For further discussion on the
increased use of aggregate litigation, see Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 776 (2010), and Emery G. Lee III, Catherine R. Borden, Margaret
S. Williams & Kevin M. Scott, Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 214 (2015).
46. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1, supra note 23, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS
BY DISTRICT (2015), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets
_By_District-October-15-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QWJ-6VY4].
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Figure 8: Pending Cases in the Federal Civil Docket and
Multidistrict Litigation, 1972–2015
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In 2015, for example, more than 150 judges were assigned one MDL; 28
had two MDLs each; and 10 had three or more, some of which involved
different manufacturers of a product alleged to be harmful.47 Thus, the
assumption that cases are randomly assigned to individual district judges

47. To calculate the number of MDLs per judge, we relied on the “Summary by Docket
of Multidistrict Litigation Pending as of September 30, 2015, or Closed Since October 1,
2014.” See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra
note 38. After tabulating the numbers presented in the report in an Excel spreadsheet, we
were able to generate a pivot table wherein we could filter the data for active MDLs only and
then calculate the number of MDLs each judge was assigned. One judge was assigned seven
cases involving mesh used in pelvic surgeries. See Id.

1916

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

(and in some districts, also to magistrate judges “on the wheel”),48 does not
apply during the pretrial process for this large segment of the docket.49
Another facet of the federal courts is the absence of lawyers in a
significant portion of the federal docket. As can be seen in figure 950 and
figure 10,51 more than 25 percent of the plaintiffs filing civil cases in
federal courts do so without counsel at the trial level;52 more than 50
percent seek appellate review without lawyers’ assistance.53

48. The image of assignments as random—at both trial and appellate levels—is not
always reflected in practice in other areas. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy,
Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2015) (identifying assignments that undermine the “long-standing
assumption of panel randomness”).
49. It should be noted that a few MDLs have played a disproportionate role in
contributing both to the federal docket and to the overall number of MDLs. Specifically, the
asbestos MDLs, at their height, numbered 59,227 in 2008. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR
2008 (2008), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical%20Analysis
%20of%20Multidistrict%20Litigation_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UUV-FLND]. In 2015,
the product liability litigation on transvaginal mesh—in seven MDLs before the Honorable
Joseph R. Goodwin in the Southern District of West Virginia—numbered 73,080. See
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 38.
Each of the seven MDLs corresponded to a different defendant: C.R. Bard, Inc. (MDL2187); American Medical Systems, Inc. (MDL-2325); Boston Scientific Corp. (MDL-2326);
Ethicon, Inc. (MDL-2327); Coloplast Corp. (MDL-2387); Cook Medical, Inc. (MDL-2440);
and Neomedic (MDL-2511). Id.
50. Data for the years 2004–2014 were taken from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts by searching table C-13 for each of the corresponding years. See Judicial Business,
supra note 52. The categories provided by the Administrative Office are “Prisoner
Petitions” and “Nonprisoner Petitions.” This figure also appears in Resnik, Revising Our
“Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1914.
51. Data for the years 1996–2014 were taken from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts by searching table B-19 for each of the corresponding years. See Judicial Business,
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business (last visited Mar. 25,
2017) (search by table number “B-19”; then, to access the data, click on the report
corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/2XGZ-2XFU]. Data for 1995 were from
table 2.4 in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Judicial Facts and
Figures. See JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.2.4, supra note 53. The categories
provided by the Administrative Office are “Criminal,” “Prisoner Petitions,” “U.S. Civil,”
“Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy Appeals,” “Administrative Agency Appeals,” and “Original
Proceedings” including miscellaneous applications. Id. This figure also appears in Resnik,
Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1913.
52. The federal district court database details pro se filings back to 2005. Every year
with data has seen at least 25 percent of civil cases filed by unrepresented plaintiffs. See
Judicial Business, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business (last
visited Mar. 25, 2017) (search by table number “C-13”; then, to access the data, click on the
report corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/YF2Z-8E2M].
53. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.2.4 (2014) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.2.4], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/table_2.04_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E3H-25ZQ]. As noted, I have sought to draw attention
to the challenges of litigation by individuals with modest sums in my other articles. See, e.g.,
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers]; see also Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13.
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Figure 9: Filings by Unrepresented Plaintiffs
in the U.S. District Courts, 2004–2015
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Disaggregated by circuits, the range runs from about one-third to nearly
two-thirds of the filings.54 These numbers include both thousands of

54. As of September 30, 2015, 51 percent of cases commenced in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals were pro se at the time of filing. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.B-9
(2015) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.B-9], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/B09Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NKS-BFHF]. Disaggregating by circuit,
the D.C. Circuit had the lowest percentage of pro se filings (33 percent), while the Fourth
Circuit had the highest percentage (64 percent). Id.
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prisoner filings and many cases brought by people who are not
incarcerated.55 Thus, the analyses of lawyer activities by Andrew Pollis56
and Morris Ratner,57 and of the impact of new rulemaking on discovery
discussed by Danya Reda,58 need to be read with an understanding that
these issues relate to a small set of cases, which could be thought of as akin
to luxury goods.59 Moreover, the concerns of Susan Saab Fortney about the
need for “prying open” courthouse doors for legal malpractice claims are
amplified.60 Despite efforts made by a subset of clients to increase
regulation of lawyers through new kinds of claims and to reduce costs
through litigation budgets, most people cannot afford lawyers, let alone
pretrial discovery.
Commentators on procedure have labeled the contemporary era the “age
of austerity.”61 In the United States, state courts have been the focus of
concern. States are strapped for funding, and their courts have millions of
litigants without lawyers. State judiciaries have established task forces on
access to courts. Reports indicate that more than four million civil litigants
in California courts lacked lawyers in 2009,62 and more than two million
such litigants were unrepresented in New York courts.63
My hope is to enlarge the lens so that the federal courts are also brought
into such discussions. Comparatively, federal courts are rich in terms of
buildings, staff, and judges. Yet, federal judges regularly report worry
about resources and now face a significant proportion of litigants who
appear in court without lawyers.

55. For example, in 2014 and in 2015, nonprisoners filed 24,274 and 25,117 cases pro
se, respectively. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-13 (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C13Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R
PU-4AT3]; U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014 tbl.C-13 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C13Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7SX-KWFL].
On appeal, nonprisoner, noncriminal cases consisted of 44 percent of all pro se cases
filed. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.B-9, supra note 54. Nonprisoner, noncriminal cases
consist of the following categories: “Other U.S. Civil,” “Other Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy,”
“Administrative Agency Appeals,” and “Original Proceedings” including “Miscellaneous
Applications.”
56. See Andrew S. Pollis, Busting Up the Pretrial Industry, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097
(2017).
57. See Morris A. Ratner, Retraining Lawyers: From “Cases” to “Tasks,” 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2151 (2017).
58. See Danya Shocair Reda, What Does It Mean to Say That Procedure Is Political?, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2203 (2017).
59. See BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Samuel Estreicher
& Joy Radice eds., 2016) [hereinafter, BEYOND ELITE LAW].
60. See Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the
Courthouse Doors for Legal Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033 (2017).
61. See, e.g., Xandra Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, General Report for the XV World
Congress of Procedural Law: Relief in Small and Simple Matters in an Age of Austerity 5
(July 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_
id=2610773 [https://perma.cc/JQB8-BW4W].
62. A.B. 590, 2009–10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
63. Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal
Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2013).
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The other structural fact about today’s litigation landscape is that, as in
this colloquium’s title referencing “vanishing trials,” almost no civil cases
reach trial in the federal courts. As of 2015, about 1 in 100 civil lawsuits
filed began a trial before either a judge or a jury.64 In terms of numbers,
2,852 civil bench and 1,882 civil jury trials were completed in 2015; the
count on the criminal side was 5,027 bench trials and 1,807 jury trials.65
Because federal data collection neither makes time-study tracking easily
available nor readily identifies cases by more than one kind of category of
cause of action or by class action status, it is difficult to know which cases
go to trial, let alone why that subset does so. An account of federal
litigation would be enriched by understanding more about the 2,000 to
3,000 cases that are tried yearly—in terms of whether the litigants are
represented, in classes or MDLs, the subject matter and stakes of the claims,
and their distribution across the United States.66 Many assume that all
filings without lawyers result in dismissal, that cases which do go to trial
include lawyers, or that no class actions go to trial. Here, I discuss a review
of the 2,973 cases identified in a database provided by the Federal Judicial
Center67 and reporting on cases ending with a trial during the year between
October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015.
Let me start with litigants lacking lawyers. About 15 percent (450 cases)
in this one-year snapshot of trial data were categorized as having at least
one party unrepresented, and 0.6 percent (18 cases) had at least one party on
both sides unrepresented.68 Less than 2 percent of tried cases (43 cases)

64. I am in the midst of other work trying to gain insights from inquiring into the cases
that actually went to trial. Thus, we examined data released by the FJC on all civil cases.
See Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2014 (ICPSR 36110), NAT’L ARCHIVE
CRIM. JUST. DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36110 (last visited
Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5A7P-2JZD]. This dataset tracks 4.6 million civil cases
brought between 1996 and 2015. Within this dataset, we counted 69,200 cases commencing
a jury or bench trial by picking cases with values 6, 7, 8, and 9 in the “PROCPROG”
column. Therefore, 1.5 percent of cases in the dataset proceeded to trial.
65. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.T-1 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/T01Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CY-YMTF]. Recall that data
from the state courts put the rate of civil trials as the mode of disposition in about 4 percent
of the cases analyzed.
66. See Emery Lee, FJC FY 2015 Termination Data (Sept. 2016) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). These data are to be posted sometime in 2017 on a new FJC
website. As with most of the data discussed in this overview, caveats are needed. In this
context, information comes from court clerks, who use civil cover sheets and other materials
prepared by lawyers and complete forms (JS5 and JS6) transmitted at least quarterly to the
Administrative Office. No independent methods of verifying uniformity or accuracy are
undertaken centrally. More caveats about the FJC Termination Data are detailed below.
67. Id. To identify cases on class actions, we filtered the civil cases database for cases
with a value of 1 in the “CLASSACT” field. To obtain cases with pro se parties, we filtered
the civil cases database for cases with a value of 1, 2, or 3 in the “PROSE” field.
68. Of the 450 unrepresented cases, 18 appeared to have both plaintiffs and defendants
pro se; 334 had pro se plaintiffs, and 98 were defendant pro se cases. The overlap of the 18
cases brings the total to 352 terminated suits with pro se plaintiffs. The causes of action
were concentrated in just a handful of categories. For the 352 cases with pro se plaintiffs,
more than half were filed by prisoners, and more than half alleged civil rights violations.
About one-fifth of those cases were employment cases, brought under the Age
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were identified as class actions.69 Of these, we looked further into dockets
and learned that at least 29 cases actually proceeded to trial as class actions;
some concluded with bench or jury verdicts, while others ended with a
settlement after some phase of trial had begun.70 Base rates are not yet
knowable. For example, public data do not track what cases are styled or
certified as class actions.
These data focus on lawyers in courts without trials. But the ambitious
questions of this colloquium—what ethics guide lawyers in twenty-firstcentury dispute resolution—need also to take on administrative agency
adjudication. Efforts are underway to understand more about the
adjudicatory work of administrative agencies, where tens of thousands of
trial-like proceedings take place, and some proceed in the aggregate.71
Returning to courthouses, as many have noted, judges do a good deal of
adjudication without trials. Researchers have looked for other metrics,
including “bench presence,” tallying the hours judges spend in open court,
whether on trial or not. Researchers mined statistics gathered by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and reported a “steady year-overyear decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012 that continued
into 2013. The results were that judges spent less than 2 hours a day on
average in the courtroom, or about “423 hours of open court proceedings
per active district judge.”72 Judges may well be involved and interact more

Discrimination Employment Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, or the
Performance Rating Act of 1950. Id.
69. Id. The labeling did not always correspond to the individual cases tracked down
thereafter. Moreover, records are incomplete in some instances. For example, an initial
review identified fifty cases, but with subsequent analyses, we learned that forty-three class
actions in FY 2015 appeared to have gone to trial.
70. In the FJC FY 2015 trial data set, another fourteen (0.5 percent) of the cases had a
tag denoting that they were remanded from MDL proceedings. Id. To obtain cases with
recorded MDL docket numbers, we filtered the civil cases database for cases with some
recorded MDL docket number in the “MDLDOCK” column. See INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM
FOR PRACTICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, CODEBOOK FOR CIVIL TERMINATIONS DATA WITH DOCKET
NUMBERS, PLT AND DEF CONTAINING ORIGINAL VALUES (2014) [hereinafter ICPSR, CIVIL
CODEBOOK]. To obtain information about MDLs, we examined data released by the FJC on
all civil cases. See Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2014 (ICPSR 36110), supra
note 64. For each case, a MDL docket number may be recorded. See ICPSR, CIVIL
CODEBOOK, supra.
71. See Federal Administrative Adjudication, STAN. U.: ADJUDICATION RES., https://
acus.law.stanford.edu/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/C9EW-XKGU]. The
database defines adjudication as
a decision by one or more federal officials made through an administrative process
to resolve a claim or dispute arising out of a federal program between a private
party and the government or two or more private parties based on a hearing—
either oral or written—in which one or more parties have an opportunity to
introduce evidence or make arguments.
Adjudication Research: FAQ, STAN. U.: ADJUDICATION RES., https://acus.law.stanford.edu/
content/user-guide (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/74QC-NQ4L]; see also
Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra note 1.
72. Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at
Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2014).
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with litigants and lawyers in chambers, in forms of alternative dispute
resolution, but these activities take place outside the public realm.73
A final basic fact to bring into focus is the array of new rulemaking—the
ACPR I referenced at the outset—which governs ADR. Hundreds of local
rules have been promulgated to govern ADR. Yet those rules rarely
address, let alone protect, the rights of the public to know much about either
the processes or the results. Privatization of process is the leitmotif.
“Procedure as contract” was what I called this shift a decade ago, as courts
promoted party-based agreement rather than dispute resolution in public
courts.74 This change in norms and practices is at the center of the essay by
Norman Spaulding, looking at how the culture of independent lawyers
serving as an adversarial check is eroding.75 Whether such processes can
provide fairness “beyond the adversary system,” as Rebecca HollanderBlumoff puts it, is a question further explored below.76
III. EQUIPAGE, AGGREGATION,
DISAGGREGATION, AND PRIVATIZATION
Direct payment of lawyers, fee shifting from defendants to plaintiffs, and
fee sharing through common benefit fund awards are methods of supporting
access to courts and of regulating lawyers. Aggregation of cases is another
way to create economies of scale. During the decades when federal dockets
were growing, all these forms of subsidies were deployed; insurance and
third-party financing were not much in focus.
In 1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation77 (LSC) and,
in 1976, enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act,78 authorizing
fee shifting from losing defendants to victorious civil rights plaintiffs. The
1966 class action rule revisions provided new means to aggregate claims.79
When these innovations were put together with fee shifting in other statutes
(such as Title VII), new sets of plaintiffs made their way into the federal
courts. In 1980, new opportunities for fee shifting arose in litigation against
the U.S. government; the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) waived
sovereign immunity to impose federal government obligations to pay
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties against the government in certain kinds
of civil litigation.80

73. Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences
and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1636–37 (2015)
[hereinafter Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts].
74. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); see
also Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts, supra note 73.
75. Norman W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process?: Antiadversarialism
in American Legal Culture, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249 (2017).
76. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Fairness Beyond the Adversary System: Procedural
Justice Norms for Legal Negotiation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2017).
77. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378.
78. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
80. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)); see also Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the
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Lawyers are the key figures in this colloquium, and hence more attention
is needed to funding possibilities for litigants with no resources to hire
lawyers directly. In 1980, Congress appropriated $300 million to support
the LSC.81 If such funding levels had remained, in real dollar terms, by
2014, the LSC would have received $850 million.82 Congress has not
matched funding and, in 2014, provided $365 million to the LSC.83
Congress also saw—and limited—the key role played by what were known
as backup centers, which had served as networks for coordination and
communication on housing, welfare, and consumer law.84
Moreover, in 1996, Congress barred legal services lawyers from
initiating or participating in class actions.85 Again, the litany of
prohibitions is familiar, as Congress imposed limits on forms of legislative
advocacy, handling voter redistricting claims, initiating representation on
behalf of prisoners, advocating that welfare laws were unconstitutional, or
requesting attorney’s fees.86 Those regulations brought the question of
lawyers’ ethics to the fore in 2001 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that
aspects of the restrictions prohibiting advice on arguments related to
welfare law or seeking to amend welfare law were impermissible under the
First Amendment.87 Regulations also barred LSC lawyers from working on
“adversarial” enforcement of final judgment and consent decrees.88
Funding remains very limited. According to the LSC, in 2014, more than
sixty-three million Americans were eligible for its services,89 but LSC
Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable
Government Conduct (pt. 1), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 220 (1994). Parties are defined to include
individuals whose net worth is less than $2 million, unincorporated business owners,
partnerships, corporations, associations, units of local government, and organizations with a
net worth that does not exceed $7 million. See id. at 297. Tax-exempt organizations and
cooperative agricultural organizations are not included in the net worth limitation.
Organizations that employ more than 500 people are not eligible. See id.
81. 2013 LSC by the Numbers, LEGAL SERVICES CORP. (July 2014), http://www.lsc.gov/
media-center/publications/2013-lsc-numbers [https://perma.cc/S9ZT-FAJS].
82. Memorandum from Lisa Wood, Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal
Aid & Indigent Def. to Legal Servs. Corp. 2 (June 2, 2014), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/
default/files/LSC/pdfs/3.%20ABA-SCLAID%20FY2016%20Budget%20Rec%20%20to%20
LSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX65-87PZ].
83. Id.; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-76, tit. IV, 128 Stat.
5, 76 (2014).
84. See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Services and the Organized Bar: A
Reminiscence and a Renewed Call for Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 305 (1998).
85. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53; see also Judith Resnik & Emily Bazelon, Legal Services:
Then and Now, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 292 (1998).
86. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act § 504(a), 110 Stat. at
1321–52; Class Actions, 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2015).
87. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001).
88. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1617.2–.3 (2016) (barring LSC recipients from initiating or
participating in class actions); see also David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions:
Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 337, 338 (1998) (describing the scope of the restrictions that the regulations
place on LSC lawyers).
89. These figures are keyed to federal poverty guidelines and permit aid to families of
four that earn $30,000 or less. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2014),
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lawyers could help only one in five of those eligible.90 And for those
hoping that their cases will attract lawyers because of the potential to
recoup fees from opponents, the Court’s narrowing interpretations of when
success permits fee shifting can make that route riskier for lawyers.91
Essays in this colloquium address the issue of lawyers working for causes
and social movements. Justin Hansford writes about the use of law “in
Ferguson and Beyond,”92 and Scott Cummings addresses problems of
accountability and efficacy.93 One measure of the pivotal role that lawyers
play in various causes and social movements comes from congressional
efforts to cut off lawyers from doing so. The targeted efforts to
disempower legal services lawyers were sketched above. Congress also
sought to limit lawyers representing prisoners. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act94 (PLRA), enacted in 1996, was animated by an effort to
“STOP” (which was the acronym for an earlier version of the PLRA) the
substantial successes that prisoners had achieved through conditions of
confinement litigation.95 The PLRA has had its own success; as Margo
Schlanger, who has analyzed prisoner litigation for several decades,
documents, the statute has “undermined prisoners’ ability to bring, settle,
and win lawsuits.”96

http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/LSC2014AnnualReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Q9L-XCVV]; see also The Future of Legal Services: The Arthur Liman
Colloquium Papers, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 283 (1998).
90. FY 2016 Budget Request, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/mediacenter/publications/fy-2016-budget-request#bfrtoc-afy-2016-budget-requests (last visited
Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WR53-67VK].
91. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001); see also Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 600–04 (2010)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the adverse consequences of the Court’s holding on
attorneys who are unable to obtain fees under the EAJA due to a Government offset to
satisfy the prevailing litigant’s preexisting debt). Fee-shifting statutes can have distinctive
tests to determine when litigants can recoup. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (clarifying the “exceptional” case standard for fee
shifting in patent cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.,
560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (holding that a litigant must obtain “some degree of success on the
merits” for the litigant’s attorney to recover fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), the feeshifting provision for most ERISA actions (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S.
680, 694 (1983))).
92. Justin Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial: Ethics for Movement Lawyers, in
Ferguson and Beyond, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2057 (2017).
93. Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking the Foundational Critiques of Lawyers in Social
Movements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2017).
94. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626 and 28 U.S.C. § 1932).
95. Overhauling the Nation’s Prisons: Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.
(July 27, 1995), 1995 WL 449222 (testimony of Steve J. Martin, General Counsel for the
Texas Department of Correction).
96. Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 153 (2015) [hereinafter Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation];
see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions over Time]; Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003)
[hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation].
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The PLRA imposed a requirement that prisoners use difficult
administrative grievance procedures and pay special filing fees; further,
Congress created new work for lawyers representing prisoners, while
lowering their potential attorney’s fees if successful.97 Congress authorized
defendants and intervenors to move to terminate injunctive relief (including
long-standing consent decrees) and directed courts to do so, absent new
fact-finding identifying ongoing constitutional violations that could only be
redressed through narrowly drawn remedies.98
Veronica Root has focused her contribution to the colloquium on
monitors in litigation seeking economic redress.99 Monitors have likewise
been central in overseeing implementation of structural injunctions in
prisons,100 and the PLRA imposed new constraints on their use by layering
additional statutory requirements on top of what Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53 provides.101 In her 2015 update on the impact of the PLRA,
Schlanger concluded that the PLRA had also “succeeded in radically
shrinking—but not eliminating—the coverage” of injunctive orders,102 in
part by limiting the “life span of new orders.”103 She mapped the decline
from 1983 to 2006 in the percentage of jails (from 18 percent to 11 percent)
and of prisons (from 27 percent to 18 percent) subjected to court orders and
the rarity of statewide court orders in the twenty-first century.104
Prisoners and other poor people are part of a larger group of individuals
whose ability to proceed collectively has been limited. In the early 1970s,
in its first major interpretation of the 1966 class action rule in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,105 the Supreme Court insisted that under the thenrecently amended Rule 23, plaintiffs provide and pay for notice to
individual class members.106 That requirement priced subsets of lawyers
out of the class action market.

97. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (limiting attorney’s fees to “an hourly rate [equal to or less]
than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18 [of the United
States Code] for payment of court-appointed counsel” and setting other limitations based on
reasonableness of fees).
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) (“In any civil action with respect to prison conditions
in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any
party or intervener.”); id. § 3626(a)(2) (“Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically
expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required
under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief . . . .”).
99. See Veronica Root, Constraining Monitors, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227 (2017).
100. See generally Vincent M. Nathan, Taking Stock of the Accomplishments and
Failures of Prison Reform Litigation: Have the Courts Made a Difference in the Quality of
Prison Conditions?: What Have We Accomplished to Date?, 24 PACE L. REV. 419 (2004);
Note, “Mastering” Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979).
101. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53, with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f).
102. Schlanger, Trends in Prison Litigation, supra note 96, at 155.
103. Id. at 168.
104. Id. at 169 tbl.8.
105. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
106. The ruling was seen as profoundly undermining Rule 23. See Kenneth W. Dam,
Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 98–99.
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Another focus of Congress was securities litigation. In 1995, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act107 (PSLRA), which
imposed new requirements atop those in Rule 23 for that subset of cases.
Before seeking class certification, “the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall cause to
be published, in a widely circulated national business-oriented publication
or wire service, a notice advising members of the purported plaintiff
class.”108 This intervention altered the market for legal services, as it
slowed down certification by requiring judges to decide which clients and
their lawyers would gain leadership status as the “most adequate
plaintiff.”109 Further, Congress sought to tie fee awards to client
recoupment, by calling for fees to be based on the amount “actually paid to”
the class, as contrasted with the value of the total fund established to be
distributed.110
In the last few years, the Supreme Court has returned repeatedly to class
actions,111 often imposing new obstacles, albeit varying with the kind of
class action and by the stage of class action proceedings. Lawyers were at
the center of concerns recounted in the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor112 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,113
which rejected large-scale mass tort class settlements. In 2011, the Court
made certification of class actions in the employment context more
expensive through imposing exacting commonality requirements.114 Yet,
other arenas of activity prove that class actions retain their vitality, with
examples ranging from environmental harms (the BP oil spill and VW
emissions) to prison conditions and solitary confinement. Further, as
sketched above and is increasingly discussed, multidistrict litigation has
become a home for mass torts.115
However, the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
has taken whole sets of potential claimants out of the courts and out of the
marketplace of lawyers. Many articles have detailed the recent expansive
interpretations of the 1925 congressional legislation now known as the
107. Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 743–49 (1995).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012).
109. See id. § 77z-1(a)(3)(A); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (“[T]he court shall consider any
motion made by a purported class member . . . and shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member
or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of
adequately representing the interests of class members . . . .”); see also id. § 77z1(a)(3)(B)(i); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (“The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.”).
110. Id. § 78u-4(a)(6) (“Total attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by the court to
counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.”); see also Lynn A. Baker,
Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Is the Price Right?: An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting
in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (2015).
111. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation
Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014).
112. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
113. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
114. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349–50.
115. See Resnik, From “Cases to “Litigation,” supra note 42, at 19–22.
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FAA.116 The Supreme Court has insisted that both state and federal courts
enforce a myriad of arbitration provisions (promulgated by issuers of
consumer credit, manufacturers of products, and employers) that preclude
aggregation before any dispute has arisen.117
In “Diffusing Disputes,” I discussed research seeking to understand
whether the mass production of arbitration clauses (requiring claimants
alleging violations of federal and state statutory and common law wrongs to
proceed single file to decision makers designated by the clauses’ providers)
have produced a mass of arbitration.118 But as I document there, empirical
research has identified very few actual filings of individual arbitrations, as
contrasted with the numbers of customers or employees subjected to those
clauses. Rather than providing more paths for claimants, the provisions
function to cut off users, thereby erasing as well as diffusing disputes.119
Lawyers are central in these developments, both as drafters of the clauses
and as targets of potential defendants seeking to end the fee incentives
available to lawyers if representing individuals in aggregates. To
understand the ways in which court access is denied requires looking at the
forms that cut off that forum, as well as at the case law interpreting their
importance. As Victor D. Quintanilla and Alexander B. Avtgis discuss in
this colloquium, data suggest that the public views these provisions
negatively.120 But even if public approval is lacking and the forms are not
readily understood, people seeking jobs or buying products cannot negotiate
the terms.
Because those provisions are buried in individual application forms or in
the fine print of consumer documents, I believe it is important to publish
and republish them, particularly here in an issue devoted to the work and
ethics of lawyers.121 Even though the graphics provided below are dense
and hard to read, these are the real forms replete with tiny print and
presented to individuals and to courts. Figure 11 is the two-page
“Application for Employment” that Waffle House (“America’s Place to
Work, America’s Place to Eat”) required prospective employees to sign.122
The document comes from the record in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,123
decided by the Supreme Court in 2002.124 To clarify what is written, let me
explain that in the hand-marked portions, Eric Scott Baker reported that he
116. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2808.
117. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 361 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). These developments are detailed in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at
2889–93, Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 53, at 118–33, and J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3061 (2015).
118. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2893–914.
119. Id.
120. Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute
Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in
the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119 (2017).
121. See, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2866 fig.6.
122. This figure also appears in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2866 fig.6.
123. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
124. Joint Appendix, Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL
34093975, at *59, *61.
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was able to start work in two weeks, that he had a diploma from high
school, and the kind of car that he drove.
Figure 11: Waffle House Employment Application
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The printed terms that were imposed by Waffle House were generic, not
personal. The form told all applicants that, were they to be employed,
Waffle House could
deduct from any monies due [them], an amount to cover any shortages
which may occur and that they had to indemnify the company against any
legal liability for withholding wages. Moreover, if money, food, or
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equipment to which he had access was alleged to be lost, applicants had
“to submit to a polygraph” or other testing.125

Below, I quote from the terms on dispute resolution set forth in microprint:
The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s
employment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of
Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such
employment, including whether such dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be
settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be
conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association in effect at the time a demand for arbitration is
made. A decision and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules
shall be exclusive, final and binding on both parties, their heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns. The costs and expenses of the
arbitration shall be borne evenly by the parties.126

What we know from the several decisions by federal judges is that Eric
Baker signed the application on June 23, 1994, at a Waffle House in
Columbia, South Carolina. Some weeks later, he was hired at another
Waffle House miles away. Soon thereafter, Baker had a seizure (that the
courts described as lasting “approximately thirty seconds”) at work. After
he lost his job in early September of 1994, Baker complained to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Waffle House had
violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA). After the EEOC filed an enforcement action in federal district
court, Waffle House sought to dismiss the case and to compel the EEOC to
go to arbitration.127
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens held that the form did
not impose a limit on a filing by the EEOC, which was authorized by
Congress to “vindicate the public interest” as well as to seek victim-specific
remedies.128 The effects of this ruling underscore the relevance of lawyers
to the capacity to pursue claims. Twenty-eight state attorneys general had
argued to the Court that the EEOC should be able to proceed, as should they
in enforcing state statutes.129 Since the decision, state and federal officials
have brought discrimination cases, and states have successfully rebuffed
defendants’ arguments that the forms preclude their doing so.130
But for ordinary people, such forms mostly keep them out of court.
Despite the Court’s characterization of the employment applications and
consumer documents as “contracts,” these “pieces of paper” deserve no

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:96-2739-O, 1998 WL 35168489, at *1
(D.S.C. Mar. 23, 1998).
128. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 290, 296–98.
129. See Brief for the States of Missouri et al. Supporting Petitioner, Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279 (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL 34131148.
130. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa
2014); Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 944 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2011); People v. Coventry First LLC,
915 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2009).
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such stature. As explained long ago by Arthur Leff, the definition of a
contract was “not only a deal, but dealing.”131 Through real negotiations—
even on form provisions—“the possibility of monolithic one-sidedness”
was reduced.132 In contrast, the form that was signed by Eric Baker was
one of many “products of non-bargaining”; as such, these were what Leff
termed “unilaterally manufactured commodities.”133 As what Leff called a
“thing,” the law ought to regulate its quality as it did other products.
But, instead of limiting arbitration to negotiated contracts, the Court
licensed expansive use of that product by applying the FAA to litigants
claiming violations of the Credit Repair Organization Act in 2012 and to a
family restaurant, Italian Colors, which argued that the American Express
Company had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act in 2013.134 Pending
before the Court as I write is the applicability of the FAA to the National
Labor Relations Act, which provides for collective action.135
As has become familiar, the Supreme Court decided the question of the
enforceability of class action bans in 2011. In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,136 a five-person majority of the Court held that the 1925
FAA’s authorization to enforce arbitration clauses permitted providers of
those clauses to impose such bans.
Here again, lawyers and markets are key drivers of the litigation
landscape. The Supreme Court addressed “class arbitration” in 2003 in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,137 in which the Court held that the

131. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 138 (1970).
132. Id. at 140.
133. Id. at 147. As I have noted in other writings, I do not want to be read as critical of
boilerplate per se, which can lower the costs of contracting and enable equal treatment across
a set of contracting parties. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contractual
Interpretation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24 (2013). My concern is about mandates in
nonnegotiated documents that require consumers and employees to forgo the pursuit of
public rights.
134. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 605, 614 (1985).
135. In January of 2017, the Court granted certiorari in three consolidated cases. Morris v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-300, 2017 WL
125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, No. 16-285, 2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.
NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 2017). The question, as phrased in the certiorari petition, in Morris is “[w]hether the
collective-bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations Act prohibit the
enforcement under the FAA of an agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate claims
against an employer on an individual, rather than collective, basis.” Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Morris, 834 F.3d 975 (No. 16-300). In addition, the Court has on its 2016–2017
docket Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). At issue is “[w]hether the
FAA pre-empts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by requiring a power of
attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorney-in-fact can bind her
principal to an arbitration agreement.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kindred Nursing Ctrs.
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-32).
136. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
137. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).

2017]

ETHICS BEYOND THE VANISHING TRIAL

1931

question of whether a contract precluded class arbitration was to be
determined initially by an arbitrator rather than a judge.138 In response,
arbitration providers offered rules for class arbitrations by incorporating
aspects of the federal class action rule.139 A database maintained by the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) detailed more than 280 such
actions listed by 2009.
Yet potential defendants sought to deflect the practice by drafting clauses
prohibiting class arbitrations.140 Some included symmetrical preclusions
(illustrated in figure 12), with terms such as “YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT
TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR
CLAIM AGAINST US . . . AND WE WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE
ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM
AGAINST YOU.”141 These clauses usually included an “anti-severability
provision,” stipulating that if a court found the clause unenforceable, the
obligation to arbitrate would become unavailable and all claims had to be
brought to court.142

138. Id. at 452–53.
139. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS (2003), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTA
GE2048284&revision=latestreleased [https://perma.cc/G9YM-2WXH]. A very helpful
overview comes from Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide
Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 303 n.20
(2004). These issues are also discussed in Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 53, at
122–23. Looking to more recent data from the AAA, some class arbitrations continue to be
filed. See Class Arbitration Case Docket, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/
services/disputeresolutionservices/casedocket (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (searching for
class arbitrations on the AAA’s Class Arbitration Docket yields nineteen class arbitration
proceedings in 2016) [https://perma.cc/K6E7-DBNK].
140. See Brief of CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 17–18, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL
709799, at *17–18.
141. That provision in figure 12, which comes from a wireless cellular phone document
from AT&T on file with the author, was not sui generis. See, e.g., Prepay Wireless Service
Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS (2000), http://www.verizonwireless.com/privacy
_disclosures/prepay_wireless_svc.html (“EVEN IF APPLICABLE LAW PERMITS CLASS
ACTIONS OR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A
CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM AGAINST US . . . AND WE
WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY
OR CLAIM AGAINST YOU.”) [http://perma.cc/X3L6-8PPC].
The self-obliged symmetrical limitation aims to avoid questions about the
enforceability of the provisions. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC,
379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that state law may find unconscionable an agreement
requiring consumers to arbitrate their claims but which permits the provider to choose
between arbitration and litigation). Whether symmetrical constraints are required is an open
question. See, e.g., THI of N.M at Hobbs Ctr., LLC, v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th
Cir. 2014); Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375, at 3, 2014 WL 4656609, at *2.
142. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a),
at 45–46 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY], http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LHZ8-L8B5].
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Figure 12: Document Accompanying
the Purchase of a Cellular Phone, 2002

The AT&T litigation became the first time the Court addressed the
lawfulness of preventing individuals from joining together in arbitration.
Vincent and Liza Concepcion filed “on behalf of all consumers who entered
into a transaction in California wherein they received a cell phone for free
or at a discount . . . but were charged sales tax” in excess of that “payable
[as] calculated on the actual discounted price.”143 The Concepcions,

143. Complaint at 5, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06CV 0675 DMS NLS
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1194855.
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overcharged $30.22, alleged that the providers had violated California’s
consumer protection laws against deceptive and false advertising.144
California law was clear on the question of the potential for group-based
procedures, for the state had both a statute and a decision145 governing the
issue. Under California law, when class waivers were in a “consumer
contract of adhesion,” predictably small damage disputes could arise
between the parties,146 and the “party with the superior bargaining power”
was alleged to have “carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,” a waiver
would be unenforceable because it functioned to exempt the party from
responsibility for the allegedly willful injury inflicted.147
The U.S. Supreme Court held, however, that the FAA preempted
California’s rule, which stood as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”148 The AT&T
Court rested its holding on “our cases,”149 which ascribed two
rationales to the FAA: “judicial enforcement of privately made agreements
to arbitrate”150 and elimination of the “costliness and delays of
litigation.”151
As many articles have since detailed, the numbers of clauses mandating
arbitration have since soared in many sectors. A 1991 survey identified
fewer than 4 percent of firms requiring arbitration in employment; by 2007,
another study found that more than 45 percent of firms did so.152 In 2008,
the estimate was that “a quarter or more of all non-union employees in the
United States”—thirty million employees—were covered.153
As I and others have also discussed, tens of millions of consumers are
obliged to use arbitration. For example, virtually all providers of wireless
services insist on mandatory arbitration, along with the option of using
small claims court for individual actions.154 Further, according to a 2015
study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), approximately

144. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (West 2017).
145. Id. § 1668; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
146. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
147. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668.
148. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
149. Id. at 345 n.5.
150. Id. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)). I
analyze this case in depth in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2889–93.
151. AT&T, 563 U.S. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 220).
152. See Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 95–96 (2014).
153. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration
in the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 ILR REV. 1019, 1020 (2015).
154. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 26, 33–34. To clarify,
“[t]he CFPB review concluded that 87.5% of the major wireless providers (servicing over
99.9% of subscribers to these providers) have arbitration obligations, and 85% (servicing
over 99.7% of arbitration-subject subscribers) also permit use of small claims court.” Id.
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fifty percent of credit card loans are subject to arbitration,155 and nearly all
that were studied “expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed on a class
basis.”156
That the purpose of arbitration clauses is to disable collective actions
rather than to enable more access to bringing claims can be seen first by
way of a brief discussion of a 2015 Supreme Court decision and by the data
we gathered relating to individual claims against AT&T over a five-year
period. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia157 is an odd case that on many metrics
would seem to merit relatively little judicial attention. At issue was a
clause written in 2007 in a service agreement that provided that “if the law
of your state” made a waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, the
obligation to arbitrate was likewise unenforceable.158 Amy Imburgia and
Kathy Greiner had sued DIRECTV and complained that DIRECTV violated
California law by imposing early cancellation penalties “often as high as
$480” and did so “directly from the customers’ bank accounts or credit
cards, using account information provided by the customers when they first
ordered DIRECTV, without consulting them or otherwise obtaining their
consent.”159
The plaintiffs claimed that the “early termination fees” bore “no relation
to the damage, if any, incurred by DIRECTV in connection with an early
termination of the service.”160 Rather, DIRECTV used the penalty “to
force customers to pay for its services for at least 18 months (and
sometimes longer) and prevent customers from readily changing to another
satellite or cable provider, even if they are no longer able to use
DIRECTV’s service due to faulty equipment or other reasons.”161
The plaintiff class sought injunctive relief “on behalf of all current and
former DIRECTV customers who were charged or may be charged an early
cancellation penalty and monetary relief on behalf of current and former
DIRECTV customers who paid DIRECTV an early cancellation
penalty.”162 The proposed class action alleged that DIRECTV had violated
the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act by “[f]ailing to disclose”
adequately the terms and the method of collecting the cancellation fees, by
including “unconscionable and unenforceable terms,” and by collecting
fees.163 The proposed class action also alleged that DIRECTV had violated
California’s false advertising law with misleading advertising.164 Remedies

155. See id. at 9, 10 fig.1, 31.
156. See id. at 44–45. That study concluded that no issuers of credit cards had dropped
arbitration clauses over the period studied; a few added such provisions. See id. at 11–12.
157. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
158. Id. at 466.
159. Class Action Complaint at 1, Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2008 WL
4264463 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(a)(9), (a)(14), (a)(19) (West 2017).
164. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2017). The proposed class also alleged that
DIRECTV violated other provisions of California law, including a section in its Business
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ranged from declaratory relief to “restitution, disgorgement, actual,
statutory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, including
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest,”165 as well as injunctive relief,
and the complaint sought “constructive trusts on all monies by which
DIRECTV was unjustly enriched as a result of collecting the early
cancellation penalties” and other remedies under California statutory and
common law, including “without limitation, restitution.”166
At that time, the law of California rendered the class action waiver
unenforceable.167 That changed in 2011, when the Supreme Court decided
AT&T. An intermediate California appellate court interpreted the clause
that DIRECTV’s lawyers had drafted and held that because it specifically
called for the application of California law, the obligation to arbitrate was
not enforceable.168 In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The
majority decision by Justice Breyer insisted that under the Court’s
approach, arbitration was obligatory.169 The dissent, by Justice Ginsburg
(joined by Justice Sotomayor), argued that courts were to “give the
customer, not the drafter, the benefit of the doubt” and hence provide
“effective access to justice,”170 while Justice Thomas viewed the FAA as
not applicable to the transaction.171
DIRECTV is a lawsuit made from lawyers’ drafting of arbitration clauses.
But, unlike the class action waiver at issue in AT&T that affected millions
of people and unlike the provisions in hundreds of documents related to
consumer goods and employment, the DIRECTV dispute related only to
older claims under clauses that lawyers, working for those imposing
arbitration, should no longer use. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent explained that
under the Court’s prior cases, the federal statute could itself be
“preempted . . . by parties’ intent,” when set forth in contracts.172 That
approach can be found in the 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel, Inc.,173 discussing that parties could choose the governing law to
apply. But in DIRECTV, the majority rejected what the contract drafters

and Professions Code prohibiting any “fraudulent . . . business act or practice” and its
common law prohibition on unjust enrichment.
165. Class Action Complaint at 22, Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2012
WL 7657788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2012), 2008 WL 4264463.
166. Id. at 2.
167. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal.
2005).
168. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 136 S.
Ct. 463 (2015).
169. See DIRECTV, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 471.
170. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 473 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). In her dissent in DIRECTV, Justice Ginsburg quoted Hall
Street; as she understood the FAA, parties could “tailor some, even many, features of
arbitration by contract, including . . . procedure and choice of . . . law.” DIRECTV, Inc., 136
S. Ct. at 473. Playing off the language in the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg also noted
that parties could even “choose to have portions of their contract governed by the law of
Tibet, the law of pre-revolutionary Russia.” Id. at 468.

1936

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

had detailed, which was to vitiate the arbitration mandate and permit a class
action in court.
Proponents of arbitration argue its utility in part by claiming it creates
more access to bringing claims. Thus, just as a discussion of trials pivots
around their increasing infrequency, a discussion of arbitration also requires
inquiries into data about their use. As I detail elsewhere and sketch here,
little evidence supports the position of arbitration enthusiasts that it expands
the use of dispute resolution in a speedy and effective way. In fact, the
mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted in a mass of
arbitrations.174
I provide two examples below, first from arbitrations involving wireless
service providers and then from data from the CFPB. I chose to focus on
claims against AT&T Mobility because that was the company involved in
the decision approving the ban on class arbitrations.175 As detailed in
“Diffusing Disputes,” under California law, providers of arbitration services
to consumers have to archive results in five-year intervals.176
The AAA has been designated by AT&T and has complied with state
reporting mandates. By looking at five years of reporting, we identified
134 individual claims (about 27 a year) filed against AT&T between 2009
and 2014.177 During that time period, the estimated number of AT&T
wireless customers rose from 85 million to 120 million people, and lawsuits
filed by the federal government charged the company with a range of legal
breaches, including systematic overcharging for extra services and
insufficient payments of refunds when customers complained.178 More
generally, the AAA, which is the largest nonprofit provider of arbitration
services in the United States, averages under 1,500 consumer arbitrations
annually;179 its full docket includes 150,000 to 200,000 filings a year.180

174. See David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L.
REV. 459, 463 (2014).
175. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352–53 (2011).
176. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2812–14. Specifically, we reviewed
the file documenting arbitrations from July of 2009 through June (the second quarter) of
2014 by filtering claims against AT&T. Id. at 2812 n.25. We then removed all claims filed
by one firm after learning that it had filed the 1,149 claims in an effort to create de facto
class actions. Thus, we identified 134 individual claims. Id. Thereafter, we sent summaries
and drafts of our analyses to AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research,
Ryan Boyle, who was very helpful in providing materials and explanations.
177. See Consumer Arbitration Statistics: Provider Organization Report, AM. ARB.
ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer/consumerarbstat (last visited Mar.
25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UPX6-FVWG].
178. See Number of AT&T Wireless Subscribers from 2007 to 2014 (in 1,000s), STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/220692/number-of-atundt-wireless-subscribers-since-2007
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [http://perma.cc/PU6N-FTP4]; 4Q 2014 AT&T by the Numbers,
AT&T (Dec. 20, 2016), http://about.att.com/content/csr/home/assets/4q2014-by-thenumbers.html [https://perma.cc/H9XB-447E]; see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction
and Other Equitable Relief at 3–4, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014); Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment
at 16, AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM.
179. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2908 fig.7 (noting that the AAA
only recorded 7,303 claims labeled consumer arbitrations, excluding construction, real
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Thus, were arbitration providers to be in high demand, their capacity to
respond would be limited.
My second example comes from the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, which looked at six credit-related markets for which, again, the
AAA is the predominant provider of arbitration services.181 The CFPB’s
“2013 Preliminary Results” reported millions of consumers subject to
arbitration and found an average of 415 individual AAA filings per year
from 2010 to 2012 in four consumer product markets—credit cards,
checking accounts, payday loans, and prepaid cards. In its 2015 report, the
CFPB added two products, private student loans and auto loans, to its
analysis—bringing the three years’ annual average up to 616.182 In the
figure below,183 we summarize the findings that about two-thirds of the
filings were by consumers, while the remaining filings included disputes
brought by both parties as well as those by companies.

estate, other industry and employment categories); Analysis of the American Arbitration
Association’s Consumer Arbitration Caseload: Based on Consumer Cases Awarded
Between January and August 2007, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/
ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LPG6S6F9].
180. Statement of Ethical Principles for the American Arbitration Association, an ADR
Provider Organization, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about/mission/
ethicalprinciples (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (describing the AAA as administering
“approximately 150,000 cases” each year) [http://perma.cc/Z4QY-9TNX].
181. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 10, 34–35. That study in
turn relied on AAA data and described the AAA as the provider in 83 percent of credit card
arbitration clauses and in 86 percent of the surveyed mobile wireless arbitration clauses.
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2853 n.238 (citing CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION
STUDY, supra note 142, at 36–39 tbls.4 & 5).
182. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 11.
183. Data are from AAA Data, July 2009–June 2014, Provider Organization Report (on
file with the Fordham Law Review), and CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142 at
11. This figures also appears in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2908 fig.7.

1938

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

Figure 13: Consumer Arbitrations Filed
with the American Arbitration Association, 2009–2014

Sources

AAA Data,
Provider
Organization
Report
June 2009–
July 2014
Consumer
Financial
Protection
Bureau, 2015
Arbitration
Study
January
2010–
December
2012

Types

AAA-defined
consumer
claims
AAA claims
involving
AT&T
AAA claims in
credit card,
prepaid card,
checking
account,
payday, private
student, and
auto loan
markets

Estimated
Number of
Consumers
85–120
million
consumers

80 million
credit-card
consumers

Average
per Year

Total

1,460

7,303

27

134*

616**

1,847

* All 134 of the consumer claims involving AT&T were filed by consumers.
** Of the 616 consumer arbitrations a year, approximately two-thirds were filed
by consumers.

IV. THE ETHICS OF LAWYERING IN DISPUTE DIFFUSION
I have sought to frame the questions of lawyers’ ethics by starting not
from lawyers and their work but from the world of dispute resolution in
which transactional, litigating, and problem-solving lawyers pursue their
profession. A brief summary of the picture of change that I have sketched
is in order, as is a discussion of its implications for the ethics and ethos of
lawyers and for the regulation of both lawyers and judges.
First, some 45 to 50 million cases (holding aside juvenile and traffic
proceedings) are filed annually in state courts; in contrast, very few people
make their way into federal court. A significant percentage of plaintiffs
who do file proceed without lawyers. Many are lawyerless because they
cannot afford to pay attorney’s fees.184
Second, the shift away from a court-centric process imposes challenges
for claimants and respondents seeking to understand the contours and the
methods of newly developed systems. Simply put, finding the ACPR is
hard, as is getting data on the processes and results. Courts today are

184. See Ian Weinstein, Access to Civil Justice in America: What Do We Know?, in
BEYOND ELITE LAW, supra note 59, at 3, 3–4.
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creating a host of user-friendly materials, such as self-help kiosks,
assistance from clerks’ offices, and many forms accessible on the web.
Parallels cannot be found in the diffuse ADR world. My students and I
have poured over a sea of arbitration clauses and governing rules to try to
figure out which kinds of rules (“consumer,” “commercial,” or “wireless”)
apply to which transactions. Accessible forms on fee waivers and
consumer-friendly guides were difficult to locate.
Third, the new systems being built do not attend to poor people and the
need for lawyers. As I have noted when analyzing rules of the AAA, some
providers—by choice and as a result of their own views of their own
ethics—limit the costs to be imposed on consumers in the arbitrations for
which it is the designated provider.185 In 2013, the AAA instituted a $200
filing fee for consumers and continued applying that fee in its 2014
consumer rule revisions.186 A few state statutes in turn impose regulations.
In 2002, as part of its packet of arbitration regulations, California required
fee waivers for “indigent consumers,” defined as those with incomes of less
than “300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines.” California instructed
providers to give consumers notice of this option and to create forms for
sworn declarations that a particular consumer qualified; providers were not
to ask for additional information.187
The AAA has complied with a form labeled “Waiver of Fees Notice for
Use by California Consumers Only,”188 which is available on the web.
Another document is available for the rest of the country, entitled an
“Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative
Fees.”189 That affidavit requires consumers outside of California to make
185. See NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL:
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 17 (1998),
https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014
[https://perma.cc/2BPE-ZTZV];
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2912 n.529 (citing CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION
STUDY, supra note 142, at 57–64). “Moreover, ‘[s]ignificant shares of arbitration clauses
across almost all markets . . . did not address attorneys’ fees.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 66). “Some clauses provided
that attorneys’ fees were to be awarded to prevailing consumers.” Id. (citing CFPB 2015
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 67–68).
186. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 34 (2014),
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=late
streleased [https://perma.cc/7Z9H-WJD3]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED
DISPUTES:
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES 14 (2013), https://www.adr.org/aaa/Show
Property?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2009997&revision=latestreleased [https://perma.cc/
MKS2-D4RF].
187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1)–(2) (West 2017).
188. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Affidavit for Waiver
of Fees Notice for Use by California Consumers Only (2011), http://www.adr.org/aaa/
ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004304 [http://perma.cc/3GB4-PFUX]; see also Search Forms,
AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/fileacase/forms (last visited Mar. 25,
2017) (including fifty-eight other forms as well as the fee waiver hardship form for
California consumers) [http://perma.cc/6RR6-YSRZ].
189. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Affidavit in Support of
Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). Thanks to AAA staff for directing me to it. On the web, the AAA indicates under
the heading “Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrators” that “parties are eligible
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detailed disclosures of assets, income, and liabilities and does not indicate
the availability of full waivers. Notably, the AAA reports that it has given
waivers when requests are made190 but that it does not track the numbers or
kinds of waivers, deductions, or deferrals given.191 Holding California
aside, publicly accessible analogues to court-based “in forma pauperis” fee
waivers are not available in arbitration.192
Fourth, the problem of learning about the use of arbitration is mirrored by
the problems of learning about the use of ADR in general. To the extent
public records exist, individual consumer arbitrations are rare. Most state
and federal courts do not require data collection on other forms of ADR
used under their aegis. In contrast, as my opening charts reflect, federal and
state courts regularly publish data on filed cases.
Fifth, aside from the arbitration mandates, when lawyers can work in
courts, many are functioning as parts of aggregated cases of various forms.
For example, reliance on MDLs has grown, enabling cost sharing
characterized by cross-plaintiff subsidies providing an infusion of resources
for individual litigants and their lawyers. Those arrangements result in a
host of dispositions, many of which provide comprehensive resolutions.
The utilities of doing so are debated, but even with hostility to class actions,
market pressures have and will continue to produce lawyers and judges and
private dispute resolvers bundling parties and claims. And like ADR and
mandated arbitration, much of the decision making goes unseen and
relatively unregulated.
As a consequence, the vitality of courts, both state and federal, has been
put into question, as has the relevance of constitutional doctrine calling for
“open courts” and “rights to remedies.” The public is excluded in most
pretrial and ADR processes based in courts, has a hard time finding agencybased adjudication, and is generally precluded from attending the
arbitrations mandated by federal law. Professionals (be they judges,
lawyers, or other dispute resolvers), as well as repeat player litigants,

for a waiver or deferral of the administration fee if their annual gross income falls below
200% of the federal poverty guidelines.” Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono
Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF%3Bjsessionid%3DR295
PCqYD5MkNKhQqm9H7jhSMwYh2NnsYFSbG6yrMhgmGVB299lc!1082660915%3F
doc%3DADRSTG_004098 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [http://perma.cc/X8BM-YP9H].
There, the AAA explains that, for its hardship affidavit “additional information . . . may be
considered,” including “past income, assets . . . and income prospects,” and that the decision
is discretionary. Id.; see also CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 11 n.51
and accompanying text (reporting that “the consumer can apply for a hardship waiver of
otherwise applicable administrative fees,” but not citing to the form itself).
190. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2913–14 (citing materials provided
by AAA staff).
191. In its research, the CFPB reported it had identified twenty-two consumer requests for
fee waivers, and twenty-three “California” fee waiver requests, in its review of the 1,847
disputes that the AAA administered that the CFPB studied. The CFPB reported that it had
not recorded the results of the request, based on the “limited data” CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION
STUDY, supra note 142, at 77.
192. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012). The federal court filing fee, as of 2015, was
$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
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function with minimal or no oversight from the public, as almost all courtand non-court-based dispute resolution proceedings now occur behind
closed doors.
In sum, dispute diffusion is underregulated, with its many facets and few
obligations imposed to provide information. Private ordering may well
create good outcomes and good process, but the public cannot learn what it
does, because we cannot find all the many providers, watch what they do,
or know of their decisions. In contrast, courts have to name who their
judges are, and these individuals gain their positions through public
processes; their caseloads and budgets are open to the public.
State and federal courts, as well as administrative agencies, are centrally
important venues, even as they are deeply flawed.193 Here, as elsewhere, I
need to reiterate that I am not arguing that courts are ideal. More than that,
barriers to entry—with lawyers’ fees high on the list—pose obstacles to
their use. As Gillian Hadfield put it: “The vast majority of ordinary
Americans lack any real access to the legal system for resolving their claims
and the claims made against them.”194 Further, courts themselves can be
exploitative, as Peter Holland recounted in his essay on “junk justice.” He
examined 4,400 lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland courts;
unrepresented debtors regularly defaulted on amounts owed (averaging
about $3,000), and those decisions were made without trials, lawyers, or
much judicial oversight.195
A recent spate of litigation related to court-user fees and fines for those
with limited resources has exposed injuries imposed by courts, producing
“endless debt cycles and the imprisonment of some for the failure to
pay.”196 Now famously, the Department of Justice in 2015 exposed the
failures of the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri;197 rather than
“administering justice or protecting the rights of the accused,” the local
court’s goal was “maximizing revenue” through “constitutionally deficient”
procedures that had a racially biased impact.198
But what I have just detailed as courts’ failures are also tributes to courts,
obliged to function in public and therefore as a resource for being able to
193. More of the problems are detailed in Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual
Heritage,” supra note 13.
194. Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts
Regulate Legal Markets, 143 DAEDALUS 83, 83 (2014).
195. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by
Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 186–87 (2014). Ninety-eight percent of the
defaulting debtors lacked counsel. Id. at 179, 208.
196. ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
SOC. JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 13–26 (2010), http://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J3AR-KRU2].
197. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 42–62 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9EKY-NS43]; see also Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016).
198. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 197, at 42, 68–69.
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uncover how they sometimes fail. State and federal judiciaries are required
to maintain records and to permit public observation—opening paths to
correct injustices, if popular will to do so exists.199 The structure of courts
has the potential to provide egalitarian redistribution of authority and the
possibility of public oversight of legal authority. Public access permits
windows into knowing whether fair treatment is accorded regardless of
status. Public processes enable judges to demonstrate their independence.
Oversight permits the policing of judges, tasked with vindicating public
rights, to ensure the loyalty to those norms. As I write, we are being given
a lesson in the value of independent judges, protected from the wrath of
public and private actors and obliged to treat disputants in an equal and
dignified manner. These are the hallmarks of legitimate dispute resolution.
And through all such public activity, debates can take place about what the
legal norms and what the fair procedures to apply should be.
Long ago, Jeremy Bentham railed against “Judge[s] & Co.,” by whom he
meant lawyers who had through the common law created an opaque and
self-serving system that benefited themselves.200 The hope is that the
democratic practices of the last two centuries have shifted the utility
calculus of judges and lawyers. The richness and depth of the contributions
to the colloquium interrogate whether paths to reviving public adjudication
can be paved. The question is whether lawyers will be part of a social
movement, infusing the alternative regimes that now dominate the
landscape of civil litigation with an ethos of public obligation to redress the
inequalities in our body politic.

199. See id. at 97–98.
200. Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public
Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 4, 21 (2011); see also 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 226–311 (John Bowring ed., 1843).

